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CHAPTER SIX 
 
Piaget and Learning Economics 
 
Jerry L. Petr 
 
 There are times when teachers of economics encounter unexpected responses to 
economics questions asked of students. Some of the unexpected responses which I have received 
are reproduced below and are worth rather careful consideration. 
 
Question: One year ago I could have bought a Volksunota (a small foreign car) for 4900 
shebangoes (which my banker tells me equals $3500). Now, however, due to inflation, a 
Volksunota costs 6300 shebangoes in its home country. Assuming the exchange rate (the 
rate at which shebangoes trade for dollars) has stayed constant, how many dollars would 
I now have to pay for a Volksunota? 
 
Answers: 
Student A—$4900. $3500 was $1400 less than 4900 shebangoes. So I subtracted 1400 
from 6300 shebangoes and got $4900. 
 
Student B—There is no way to tell. In the first case it cost 4900 shebangoes here, not in 
its home country, so you have to consider import taxes and export taxes, etc., plus the 
cars usually sell much cheaper in their own countries. Even if the rate of exchange is the 
same there may be more taxes in the home country you don’t know about. 
 
Student C—$3510. For constant exchange rate, the increase of 1400 shebangoes is 
equivalent to (3500)(1400)/(4900) = x dollars = $10. So you would have to pay $3510. 
 
Question: Economists sometimes use what they call the “Equation of Exchange.” This equation 
says that the supply of money (M) times the velocity of money (V) equals the general 
price level (P) times the real quantity of goods available (Q). The equation is therefore 
MV=PQ. Using that equation, what can you tell me about the effect of an increase in the 
money supply (M) on the general price level (P)? 
 
Answers: 
Student A—P will increase. More dollars chasing same amount of goods. Simple cause 
and effect. 
 
Student B—Having only brief contact with this equation before I would say that increase 
in M would cause a reduction in P offset by an increase in Q and a decrease in V. Using 
present economic situation in reverse. 
 
Student C—Increased money supply devaluates the dollar therefore the price level would 
increase. If the price level did not increase, there would be much more spending, but to 
tell you the truth, I think it would go the other way. 
© 1982  Chapter 6, Page 1 
 
Piagetian Programs in Higher Education   Edited, 2007 
 
Question: I know of a manufacturer who has found that no matter what price he charges, the 
quantity he sells always adjusts so that the total revenue is constant. That is, if he lowers 
his price sales increase just enough to keep total revenue constant, and vice versa. He 
wants to know what quantity he should produce in order to maximize his profits. What 
would you tell him? 
 
Answers: 
Student A—He should produce to obtain a profit. He should lower his overhead. 
 
Student B—He must pick his quantity so that the price is low enough so that the demand 
is high, but not so high that he cannot supply enough of the product to meet the demand. 
 
Student C—It doesn’t matter. Because if his total revenue is always the same, and his 
quantity sold, adjust to the price he is selling the goods for, keeping the total revenue a 
constant he could produce 1 or 1,000,000 units and never increase his total revenue. 
 
 These three questions are significant to me because each requires thought processes 
which are important in economics and in many other areas of problem solving. In addition, they 
are problems which, in spite of the specific “content words” do not require prior economic 
education to arrive at the correct answer. Just as one does not need to be a physicist to isolate 
variables which might influence the flexibility of solid rods, so one does not need to be an 
economist to utilize ratios to convert shebangoes to dollars. No economist has heard of a 
shebango anyway. 
 
 The first question implicitly asked the student to engage in proportional reasoning. The 
second demanded the capability of isolating a variable and analyzing its effect while mentally 
holding others constant. The third required the student to identify a relevant factor (cost) beyond 
those specified in the problem, and to apply a proper algorithm to find a solution. While some 
students (whose answers are not reproduced here) answered each problem well, a substantial 
number demonstrated inability to deal with the requirements of the problems. Why? What can 
the economics educator do about it? 
 
 Generalizing from introspection, I presume that many of us would respond by saying, 
“Those students are dumb. They shouldn’t be in college.” And, finding them in our classrooms, 
we would recognize two alternatives. We could “flunk them out.” Or, we could gear our teaching 
to their answers and hope that by teaching the algorithm for each type of problem, and giving 
them a basketful of “clues” about when a ratio is appropriate and when to say “all other things 
equal,” etc., they could memorize their way to a passing grade. We would also recognize that 
after we had “taught” them to calculate dollar prices of Volksunotas, it would be up to the 
mathematician to “teach” them how to calculate the distance in kilometers from Wahoo to 
Broken Bow, given the distance in miles and the conversion ratio. That is, although the problems 
are formally identical, we are aware that they do not appear so to many students. 
 
 Bafflement at some of these student responses, together with dissatisfaction at the 
perceived levels of dealing with them, evidently made me receptive to the possibilities in an 
alternative explanation and prescription. The alternative which has stimulated much of my recent 
educational thinking and activity is provided by Swiss psychologist and epistemologist Jean 
Piaget and his followers. While full explanations of Piaget’s theories are available elsewhere (see 
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bibliography) by people more competent to offer them, some brief recitation of my interpretation 
of Piaget’s possible relevance to instruction in economics might better illuminate my view of the 
economic component of ADAPT. 
 
 The focus of Piaget’s research and writing is the process of human intellectual 
development. The idea of “development,” that is, progressive change, is crucial to understanding 
possibilities for learning. For Piaget, in each of four developmental stages through which a 
person passes from infancy to childhood, certain kinds of mental capabilities are acquired. The 
developmental process is a process of acquisition of mental “structures” which allow 
performance of increasingly sophisticated mental tasks. 
 
 For one who has lived with and observed children growing up from birth through 
adolescence, the concept of mental stages of development is intuitively appealing. It seems clear 
that, regardless of the “intelligence” of a youngster, there are ages at which certain mental 
patterns or thought processes are not present. And it also seems clear that as the child grows 
older the complexity of mental tasks which can be performed increases. Piaget identifies the 
stages through which he believes we pass, suggests the kinds of mental processes associated with 
each stage, and cautions us that the rate of development is not uniform but varies between 
individuals and specifically between “cultures.” 
 
 Piaget further hypothesizes that intellectual development is a function of four variables: 
maturation (and associated physiological changes), experiences (both physical and mental), 
education (broadly defined), and “self-regulation.” For him, self-regulation, the most significant 
variable, is the process whereby an individual mentally wrestles with discomfiting information 
(such as experimental results contrary to expectations) until a satisfactory mental reconstruction 
allowing intellectual equilibrium takes place. 
 
 To a college educator, the most significant aspect of the developmental schema is that 
which appears to be relevant to college-age people. The final two developmental stages 
discussed by Piaget are the stages of “concrete operations” and “formal operations.” An 
“operation” is a mental process, the “essence of knowledge,” in which the “object of knowledge” 
is acted upon. An operation may be ordering, or classifying, or hypothesizing. It is “concrete” 
(characteristic of the penultimate stage of development) if it operates on concrete objects or 
experiences. The operation is “formal” (characteristic of the highest stage in the Piagetian 
developmental schema) if it involves reasoning about hypotheses, mental manipulation of 
abstractions, reasoning about contrary-to-fact situations, and operations of propositional logic. 
(These are not meant to be exhaustive or scientifically precise definitions.) 
 
 Obviously, against the background of the Piagetian theory, many persons with college 
classroom teaching experience may be tempted to wonder whether there is not a possible 
mismatch between the level at which the student is prepared to receive learning and the level at 
which instruction is offered. Piaget (1964, p. 180) specifically notes that  
 
 “(the student) can receive valuable information via language or via education.....only if 
he is in a state where he can understand the information. That is, to receive the information he 
must have a structure which enables him to assimilate this information. This is why you cannot 
teach higher mathematics to a five-year-old. He does not yet have the structures which enable 
him to understand.” 
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 My colleagues in ADAPT and I have succumbed to that temptation to wonder about 
consistency between levels of teaching and structures for learning and have begun to consider 
the consequences of teaching a subject (such as economics) using texts, problems, examples, and 
language which demand mental skills typical of a “formal operational” learner. If, as Piaget 
seems to believe, all persons attain the formal operational level during adolescence, or certainly 
by age 20, disparity between level of teaching and preparation for learning should not be a 
problem. If, however, we are aware of the several studies1 which indicate that many of the skills 
identified with formal operations (combinatorial logic, proportional reasoning, separation of 
variables) are not evidenced by a large proportion of college students, we must consider our 
options. 
 
 If we are willing to consider the possibility of developmental stages, roughly as described 
by Piaget, and if we agree that many of our college students do not seem to function at the 
formal level, at least in some disciplines, two choices are apparent. We can ignore the theory and 
the data and continue to teach, presumably at the formal level, with continued mixed results, 
occasionally resembling those with which this essay began. Probably the less clever “concrete” 
thinkers will soon “flunk out” and quit giving us disquieting answers to exam questions. (Or, if 
we make those questions multiple-choice, we won’t see the mental process at all.) The more 
clever or diligent concrete thinkers may struggle to a diploma via memorization or algorithmic 
applications. 
 
 Or, we can attempt to revise our pedagogy to make it accessible to the concrete as well as 
the formal student. How that might be done, or at least attempted, is the stuff of most of the rest 
of this essay. It is that attempt that consumes the time and energy of the ADAPT staff. 
 
 Before discussing concrete curricular or pedagogical adjustments which have resulted 
from the Piagetian perspective, one other aspect of the developmental theory should be re-
emphasized. That is the speculation that experience and self-regulation are two of the agents 
which foster progress from one stage to the next. The idea of reconstructing higher education to 
make it accessible to pre-formal thinkers is attractive to me only as a development-stimulating 
process. If we can provide environment and experience necessary for self-regulation to occur, 
and hence to assist the transition from concrete to formal, the potential worth of such 
pedagogical modification is immense. If no development is fostered, or if the group of students 
we are trying to advance are not capable of making the transition, the benefit-cost ratio would 
not be appealing to me. 
 
 At this point we should become much more concrete and discuss the teaching of 
economics from a Piagetian perspective. We should first turn our attention to consideration of 
how a number of basic economic concepts, taught in almost every “principles of economics” 
course, fit within the Piagetian classification. My thoughts on this are preliminary and tentative. 
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 As I understand Piaget, concepts which are concrete, or accessible to the person in the 
concrete operational stage of development, are likely to possess some of the following 
characteristics: 
 
 1) drawn directly from personal experience; 
 2) involve elementary classification and generalization concerning tangible objects; 
 3) utilize direct cause and effect relationships in a simple two-variable situation; 
 4) can be taught or understood by analogy, or algorithm, or “recipe;” 
 5) are “closed,” not demanding exploration of possibilities outside the stated data. 
 
 Conversely, concepts which are formal, or accessible to the person in the formal 
operational stage of development, are likely to possess some of the characteristics in the 
following list: 
 
 1) may be hypothetical, imagined, contrary-to-fact; 
 2) may be “open-ended” demanding speculation about possibilities not spelled out; 
 3) may require deductive reasoning from unverified hypotheses; 
 4) may require definition by means of other concepts of abstractions, with no obvious 
correlation to tangible reality; 
 5) may require intermediate steps or concepts not established in the original data. 
 
 If we look at the content of early courses in economics, how do the things we teach fit 
within the classification system described here? A list of topics often covered might include, 
among many others, gross national product, demand, comparative costs, economic profit, 
multiplier, equilibrium, investment, economic efficiency, elasticity, marginalism, income tax, 
index numbers, and returns to scale. 
 
 Some of these ideas, such as income tax, investment, gross national product, seem 
amenable to definition and explanation in terms or familiar situations or examples and are 
probably properly thought of as within the concrete realm. (Some aspects of these, such as 
imputed income in GNP calculations, may be more difficult for the concrete operational person 
to comprehend.) On the other hand, comparative costs, multiplier, economic efficiency, and 
economic profit must be defined in terms of other proportional reasoning or idealized models, 
and may properly be classed as formal concepts. (Now I understand why so many students have 
so much trouble understanding those “Florida oranges”/“Nebraska wheat” comparative cost 
tables designed to illustrate potential gains from trade. They require a kind of proportional 
reasoning which may be out of reach for some students.) Concepts such as marginalism, or 
elasticity, are, I think, formal; but they can rather easily be explained quantitatively with simple 
formulae and algorithmic thinking. This last point is important because it suggests that formal 
ideas may be discussed concretely; it is equally likely that concrete ideas (such as demand) can 
be discussed quite formally. 
 
 Obviously, one conclusion which emerges from all of the preceding hypothesizing is that 
the topics we teach, or the way in which we teach them, may be inaccessible to learning by some 
of our students who have not yet achieved the formal operational stage in the development 
process. Whether their developmental process might be stimulated by a pedagogy which utilized 
their concrete operational skills, provided added experiences as raw material for mental growth, 
and encouraged self-regulation to take place is the question addressed by the ADAPT program. 
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 The translation of Piagetian theorizing into a college economics curriculum by a person 
with no claim to competence in developmental psychology is a frustrating, time-consuming, 
difficult process. What follows is a discussion of premises from which I began, objectives by 
which I was guided, and pedagogical methods used in an attempt to create Piaget-based 
economic topics course for college freshmen. The process continues. 
 
 The premises on which the ADAPT economics curriculum is based are drawn from 
Piaget’s work. They are, basically: 
 
 1) there is a process of human intellectual development; 
 2) a significant proportion of college freshmen are not yet “formal operational;” 
 3) utilizing an educational strategy which makes concepts accessible to the concrete 
operational student, and which causes intellectual “disequilibrium,” may lead to “self-regulation” 
and intellectual development. 
 
 As I work from those premises to construct and implement an economics curriculum, my 
objectives include the following: 
 
 1) to build a “learning cycle” (exploration, invention, application, as described below) for 
each unit of instruction; 
 2) to ensure, as part of that learning cycle, that each unit has an “experiential,” 
“concrete,” exploration activity which allows students to generate data and actively participate in 
an economic activity; 
 3) to establish circumstances where mental “disequilibration” is likely to occur and where 
“self-regulation” could follow. 
 
 In my view, and as reflected in Piaget’s experimental work a laboratory or similar 
opportunity for “doing” the exploratory work is a key element in the pedagogy. Such an 
involvement with the subject matter is vastly preferable to simply thinking about it or listening to 
someone talk about it. Of course, in this respect, natural sciences seem to have a pedagogical 
advantage over the social sciences; and the latter a similar advantage over disciplines such as 
English or philosophy. 
 
 Although economics is not usually taught as a laboratory subject, and, in fact, an 
economics laboratory is not easily developed, two kinds of activities have been useful to me in 
this Piagetian venture. The first, employed whenever possible, is direct, “real world” activity. 
This can be employed with topics such as price indices or public finance. The second kind of 
activity, resorted to when real world interaction is not feasible, is in-class simulation games and 
activities. This is suitable for macroeconomic theory, or money expansion, or international trade. 
Some topics, such as market structure, can be developed via a combination of gaming (to 
illustrate oligopolistic market behavior) and community activity (comparing prices in 
competitive versus oligopolistic markets). 
 
 One example from each pedagogical mode (“real world” and simulation) may indicate 
how I view the implementation of a learning cycle approach to economic activities. 
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 Development of a College Student Price Index (analogous to the Consumer Price Index) 
is one “real world” activity which ADAPT students have accomplished and which exemplifies 
most of the pedagogical components discussed so far. Particularly during an inflationary period, 
a device which can help them see the shape and size of inflation as it affects them, is of interest 
to students. 
 
 The exploration phase of this learning cycle involved two components. One was a survey 
of the students themselves to determine what they bought and what they spent for it. The basis 
for the survey responses was a record the students were asked to keep for a period of two weeks, 
listing all purchases and amounts expended. The second exploration component was gathering 
price data from the shelves of Lincoln merchants. 
 
 Many “inventions” of kinds of concept formation were necessary to bring construction of 
a respectable price index to completion. One invention centered on the concept of a 
“representative market basket” of student utilized commodities. It was of course apparent to the 
students that we could not manage an index which contained every conceivable purchase during 
the school year. Thus their own records of purchases made were used to generate a list of 65 
products, selected by the class, to represent their buying activity. 
 
 The students were soon confronted by the fact that simply adding up the prices of the 
selected commodities during two time periods and comparing the results was not sufficient as a 
representation of changes in their purchasing power. The importance of each item, or class of 
item, in their budget needed to be considered; thus the ideas of grouping the commodities into 
“classifications” and appropriately “weighting” each class were interjected. Six classifications 
were used (food, toiletries, school supplies, recreation, clothing and miscellaneous) and weights 
were assigned again based on recorded expenditures over the two week period. (Housing was 
omitted because of the anticipated stability of dorm rates during the academic year.) 
 
 The necessity for developing standards and specificity in product selection quickly 
became apparent. Simply going to the store and pricing “soap”, or “gasoline” was not good 
enough; and our list soon specified “Dial, 5 oz.”, and “DX plus” gasoline. Thus the idea of “care 
and rigor in data collection,” and the possibility of subsequent “replication” were made tangible 
to the student. 
 
 Not to be forgotten among all the other inventions which were occurring is the concept of 
an “index number” itself. The students found indexation a useful concept to make some sense 
out of the mass of information gathered over a period of time; and it was regarded as a helpful 
aid rather than a teacher-imposed harassment by the time it was used in class. 
 
 Finally, the application phase of this unit is nicely built in, as the students were given the 
job of price gathering and index calculating at the first of each month. Thus we watched the 
index grow from 100 on September 1 to the level of 104.8 on March 1. Each month the 
movement of the components of the index is somewhat different, the effects of seasonal changes 
are apparent, and the students become more comfortable with this tool. Disequilibration and self-
regulation were a natural and unavoidable part of the process. Having student A price soap one 
month at $.89 and having student B report it at $.35 the following month led to the self-
regulation of product specification and standardization. The idea of grouping and weighting 
grew from the disequilibration caused by having the 10% change in the price of a pair of shoes 
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completely overwhelm price decreases in small-ticket items such as toothpaste when the entire 
list was aggregated in an undifferentiated way. 
 
 Simulation activities, although more artificial than price index construction, appear 
generally engrossing to students and have been used frequently. One successful venture involved 
several simple trading activities carried on in the classroom and designed to teach something 
about relative prices, market equilibrium, and gains from trade. 
 
 Our trading activity began by grouping students into clusters of eight (each of which 
could be regarded as a country), and allocating a set of commodities (jelly beans, gum, pencils, 
paper, paper clips) to each student. Allocations varied among students, and among groups, 
although some of the groups received allocations heavily weighted towards the edibles, and the 
rest received allocations heavily weighted toward the office supplies. 
 
 Intra-group trade then took place, with students recording the offer and trade process, 
until “equilibrium” was reached. We discussed why trade occurred, who “gained” from each 
trade, and why trade ceased. 
 
 Each group was then asked to develop group supply and demand curves for one 
commodity in terms of a second (gum in terms of jelly beans). They tested both supply and 
demand at various hypothetical prices, aggregated the data across the group, and graphed it. This 
exercise also established an equilibrium price for the commodity in question within each group. 
 
 Finally, the groups were free to engage in inter-group trade, again recording the process 
carefully. As expected, trade flowed from low cost to high cost countries, with all costs being 
dominated in goods. Thus the students could easily see that different gum:jelly bean prices in 
two countries established potential for gains to both via trade. 
 
 In this trading exercise the exploration activities involved the trading itself. Inventions 
included utility, demand and supply curves, relative prices, and gains from trade. Applications of 
these inventions were, unfortunately, primarily paper and pencil replications and problem-
solving. 
 
 I would not claim any novelty in the use of classroom games or simulation activities. 
Such devices are familiar to many innovative educators and readers of pedagogically-oriented 
journals. What I do claim as novel is the establishment of a connection between all such 
“concrete” activities and a psychologically based theory which illumines the role such activities 
can play and the objectives they may fulfill. Thus instead of haphazard use for reasons of novelty 
or student enjoyment, they become the necessary exploration and disequilibration components of 
the concrete/formal transformation process. 
 
 Other concepts in economics can be approached via the learning cycle. Doing so 
generates greater student involvement with their own learning, allows them to work with data of 
their own development, and assures that the valued concepts emerge from concrete activities 
familiar to the students. 
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 After one year of “ADAPTATION” in economics, what sort of appraisal is warranted? A 
cautious one. Quantitative information is not yet available on student mental development, 
personal growth, college dropout rate, etc. I believe I can identify pedagogical improvements yet 
to be made, such as further individualization of materials to accommodate better the wide range 
of student capacities and interest. I know that we dealt with fewer economic concepts during this 
academic year than I would have “covered” in a standard principles of economics course 
(perhaps this year we “uncovered” a few.) And yet I’ve worked much harder. 
 
 My professional assessment at the present time would include the following observations. 
 
 A. The Piagetian framework for understanding human intellectual development is useful 
in explaining the kinds of learning problems which appear in my classrooms. I am reasonably 
sure that a significant portion of my students cannot engage in “formal operations.” 
 
 B. That understanding forces me to face that problem. I know that some of what I teach 
in economics is properly regarded as demanding formal thought. My past teaching habits 
involved extensive presentation of abstract concepts beyond the reach of “concrete operational” 
students. I can choose to revise my teaching to increase the accessibility of the material or I can 
“flunk out” the less advanced students. 
 
 C. The prospects of enhancing intellectual development through pedagogical activities 
which focus on that objective are stimulating enough to cause me to continue the attempt to 
develop techniques and materials suitable for that task. Until we demonstrate that such 
intervention is ineffectual, or is more costly in terms of effort, content mastery, or some other 
relevant variable, than the benefits merit, my involvement with this line of exploration will 
continue. 
 
 Occasionally I slip back into the comfortable lecture mode, and “tell the students what 
they need to know.” They are respectful and attentive (probably relieved to sit quietly back in 
blissful inactivity for a change) and it “feels good” for me to be doing what I’m comfortable 
with. The lectures I deliver are generally good, clear, articulate, precise, sprinkled with humor, 
and well-paced. I leave the room on such occasions feeling very pleased with my hour’s effort. 
But, when I try in a subsequent class period to retrieve from the students what was delivered to 
them two days previously, my “high” evaporates. There is little retrieval possible. 
 
 The results from the “learning cycle” are better—not perfect, but better. Students who 
have been involved with the materials and have generated the data seem to have a stronger, surer 
grasp of what concepts are involved. The ideas mean something to them, in terms they can 
understand, and therefore are better retained and used. And it’s exciting, even for an instructor, 
to watch textbook concepts actively reproduced in a classroom setting. 
 
 On balance, I’ve seen enough to continue the activity. Perhaps, as an additional year or 
two of curriculum development and experience passes, strong positive results will be apparent. 
Perhaps not. But the pursuit of student intellectual development and the potential implications of 
Piagetian theory for college teaching makes the venture worth the effort. 
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EPILOGUE 
 
 The preceding essay, written four years ago, reflects my early involvement with Piagetian 
ideas and my attempts to modify my teaching to accommodate them. I am satisfied to have it 
stand as a marker on a path I have found helpful; but I also wish, through these few 
supplementary paragraphs, to comment on subsequent educational territory through which that 
interest in Piaget has led me. 
 
© 1982  Chapter 6, Page 11 
 
Piagetian Programs in Higher Education   Edited, 2007 
 
 On reflection, the fundamental perspective from which a variety of educational concerns 
have grown, for me, is awareness of the student as an educational variable. As surprising as it 
may seem, in retrospect, most educational innovation and experimentation, at least in the social 
sciences, appears to take the student as given and proceed to the modification of other 
educational factors (curriculum, pedagogy, equipment). The impact of these external variables 
on demonstrated student learning is, in most cases, the focal point of educational 
experimentation. The Piagetian perspective, on the other hand, opens the educator’s eyes to 
internal states of student development as extraordinarily potent educational variables which must 
be considered and dealt with if we are to attain our educational objectives. 
 
 Grounded in that primacy of student internal state and potential as central concerns of the 
educational endeavor, my professional attention has been drawn beyond the preceding paper in 
three directions. The first of these is a relative shift from concern with the “stage of 
development” to concern with the nature of learning (epistemology) as a guide to educational 
strategy. The second direction which portends fruitful investigation is the expansion of the 
Piagetian view of intellectual development and its integration with parallel developmental 
theories into a more holistic picture of human growth. And, the third consequence of my 
Piagetian awareness has been consideration of the relationship between academic disciplines 
(more correctly, interdisciplinary education) and cognitive development. The following few 
paragraphs provide a hint of the progress which might be made along each of these intellectual 
paths. 
 
 1) Prodded and stimulated by the ideas of my colleague David Moshman, my attention 
has shifted a bit from Piaget’s analysis of mental stages to the Piagetian “constructivist” 
epistemology.1 While the differentiation between concrete and formal approaches to reasoning 
remains helpful to my understanding of students and my own teaching, consideration of the 
constructivist idea of learning provides more help to me in creating learning activities. 
Concentration on the interactive nature of learning is productive for me as it guides me toward a 
pedagogical method suitable for both concrete and formal reasoning approaches. After all, stage 
identification or classification does seem less important than proper development of effective 
teaching/learning strategies. 
 
 2) Piaget is not the only scholar assessing human maturational processes from a 
developmental perspective. The idea of integrating Piaget’s views on cognitive development 
with related approaches such as William Perry’s study of “intellectual and ethical” 
development2, and Lawrence Kohlberg’s analysis of moral development3, seem to offer benefits 
to college educators.4 By attending to a more complete understanding of the young adult learners 
who more often populate our classrooms, we may develop insight into their attitudes toward 
learning, toward authority, toward “right answers”, toward intellectual curiosity, and toward the 
values system which drives them. All this in addition to awareness of their reasoning process! It 
is my view that such expanded awareness of the “whole person” may allow us to be much more 
effective in providing educational experiences better suited to the constructive abilities which 
our students possess. 
 
 3) An additional extension of my thinking “post-Piaget” has been reflection on the 
relationship between the constructivist epistemology and interdisciplinary education.5 Paralleling 
the thoughts of other development-oriented educators6, my hypothesis is that interdisciplinary 
education has the potential, in several ways, to be more conducive to constructive learning than 
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traditional discipline-oriented curricula. The “real world”, at least for social scientists, is 
interdisciplinary; it is holistic. If we argue, as I do in the preceding paper, that “experiential” 
activities are consistent with the constructivist epistemology, we may then consider the use of 
society as our interactive laboratory. And that laboratory is best perceived through 
interdisciplinary eyes. 
 
 Further, the varied perspectives on any given social topic, problem, or issue provided via 
interdisciplinary investigation offer a non-contrived way to generate mental disequilibration or to 
challenge authority-based ideas of education which may dominate our students. 
 
 Finally, then, the Piagetian insights reflected in “Piaget and Learning Economics” remain 
a foundation for my approach to economic education. As does any foundation, they provide a 
base upon which further work can be constructed. In my own case, such extensions involve 
consideration of the significance of epistemological constructivism, more integrative 
understandings of human development, and the significance of interdisciplinary education for the 
developmentalists. 
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